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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J.LUIES C. K~IGHT and BE~\TRICE M. 
Kl~IGHT, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
vs. 
l~T..:UI PCfWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a 
corporation and OGDE..\ RIVER WATER 
lTSER.S ASSOCld_TIOX, a corporation, 
Defendants and Appella!nts. 
' 
Brief of Appellants 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties to this appeal will hereafter be desig-
nated as they were in the Court below, where respondents 
were the plaintiffs and appellants were defendants. 
Plaintiffs, ,,-ho are husband and wife, brought this 
action against the defendants to recover One Thousand 
Eight Hundred Twenty Five ($1,825.00) Dollars dam-
ages claimed to have been sustained by them by reason of 
the flooding of their premises, which flooding allegedly 
resulted from defendant~· negligence. The case \Yas 
tried before the Court and jury on N oYember :20th, 21st, 
25th and 26th, 1947, in the District Court for Weber 
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County, the Honorable Charles G. Cowley presiding. 
At the opening of the trial, counsel for plaintiffs made 
an opening statement of plaintiffs' case (Tr. 3-4), fol-
lowing which defendants separately moved for judgment 
of non-suit (Tr. 5), which motions the court denied (Tr. 
5). Upon the conclusion of plain tiffs' case in chief, 
defendants separately moved for judgement of non-suit 
(Tr. 132-134), which motions the court denied (Tr. 134). 
After both sides had rested the defendants separately 
moved for a directed verdict "No cause for action", (Tr. 
257-259·), which motions the court denied (Tr. 260). 
Thereupon the cause was submitted to the court under 
instructions ~by the court, and the jury in due course re-
turned its verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and against 
the defendants for the amount of One Thousand Two 
Hundred Fifty Eight and 75/100 ($1,258.75) Dollars (Tr. 
289). The verdict was by six of .the eight jurors, .two 
jurors dissenting therefrom (Tr. 289). Thereafter, and 
within the time allowed by law, the defendants each 
moved the ·court for a new trial, which motion was on 
December 8, 1947, denied. The defendants thereupon 
;filed on February 19, 1948, their notice of appeal from 
the judgement entered on the verdict, and from the order 
denying their motions for new trial. The statutory un-
dertaking on appeal was waived by plaintiffs. 
Hereafter, where it becomes necessary to refer to a 
defendant separately, defendant Utah Power and Light 
Company will, for ·convenience, be referred to as the 
Power Company, and defendant Ogden River Water 
Users Association, as the Water Users. 
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rrHE PLEADINGS 
Plaintiff~' action \Ya~ based on the following com-
plaint, as amended (omitting· title, signatures and verifi-
cation); 
·" Uome UO\\' the plaintiffs and complain of the 
defendant~ and for cause of action allege: 
""1. The defendant Utah Power & Light 
Company is and at all times herein mentioned was 
a corporation duly orga11ized and existing under 
the la\YS of the State of Maine and duly licensed 
to do busines~ within the State of Utah. The de-
fendant Og·den River Water Users Association is 
and at all times herein mentioned was a corpora-
tion duly organized and existing under the laws 
of the State of Utah. 
'' 2. At all times herein mentioned the plain-
tiffs were the owners of the following described 
real property situated in Weber County, State of 
Utah: 
'All of Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5, Block 12, The 
Hermitage of Ogden Canyon, situate in the North-
east qu~rter of the Southeast quarter of Section 
18, Township 6 North, Range 1 East Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey.' 
The said real property was at all times herein 
mentioned improved with a frame dwelling with 
six rooms and a bath having hardwood floors and 
knotty pine finish, together with a cesspool sewer 
system constructed in said lands for the use of the 
said house. The ~aid dwellip_g- house was com-
pletely furnished, at all times herein mentioned 
\vith customa1·y household furnishings, furniture 
and fixtur~~ incl udiug a console radio and at the 
time of the flooding of the ~aid premises as here-
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inafter alleged the plaintiffs owned and had 
stored therein large quantities of clothing, lug-
gage and other personal property. 
'' 3. At the time of the flooding of the said 
premises the said household furniture, furnish-
ings and equipment aforesaid, which were all 
property of the plaintiffs, were of the reasonable 
value of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars and 
upwards. The said dwelling house was of the 
reasonable value of Five Thousand ( $5,000.00) 
Dollars and upwards, and the clothing, luggage 
and household supplies aforesaid were of the 
value of One Thousand ($1,000.00 Dollars and 
upwards. 
'' 4. At all times herein mentioned a large 
wooden water pipe or flume was laid on the N ortb 
side of Ogden Canyon in said Weber County on 
a point near the head of said Ogden Canyon past 
the premises of the plaintiffs aforesaid through 
the mouth of Og·den Canyon. The said pipe or 
flume was then and there owned, controlled and 
maintained by the defendants jointly and the said 
defendants were at all times herein mentioned 
under contractual obligations with each other and 
with the United States of America to be jointly 
responsible for the care and maintenance of said 
pipe. The said pipe was originally constructed 
and laid by the defendants and the United States 
Government as a joint enterprise for the use and 
benefit of the defendants. 
'' 5~ The defendants at all times herein men-
tioned used the said water pipe to conduct water 
u:nder great pressure and at g~reat velocity for the 
purposes of the defendants from the head of 
Ogden Canyon to the mouth thereof. In the con-
struction and in the maintenance of the said water 
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pipl~ and in the use thL_\reof in violation of the duty 
\Yhieh the defendant8 and eaeh of them owed to 
all property O\Yuers in said Ogden Canyon and 
particularly to the plaintiffs, the defendants care-
h)ssly and neg·ligent ty eonstructed and maintained 
the said pipe by en relessly and negligently failing 
to protect the same from larg·e stones and boulders 
\Yhich during the spring of each year roll down 
the steep mountainsides of said Ogden Canyon 
and across the place \Yhere the said pipe wa.s and 
is constructed and maintained, but on the contrary 
the said defendants carelessly and negligently left 
the said pipe lying unprotected upon the surafce 
of the gTound in the places where the said bould-
ers roll down said mountainsides, and carelessly 
and negligently coursed large quantities of water 
under pressure into and through said pipe so 
left unprotected. . The defendants and each of 
them \Yell knew, or by the exercise of reasonable 
care could have known that in the spring of every 
year rocks being loosened on the melting of the 
frost roll down the sides of said moutains and 
across the place where the parties laid and main-
tained said pipe vvithout protecting the same from 
said rocks and boulders. · 
"6. On or about the 28th day of February, 
1946, during a spring thaw large rocks and bould-
ers became loosened from the moutainside of said 
Ogden Canyon and rolled down said mountain-
side with gTeat force and violence and rolled into 
and upon the said waterpipe so left negligently 
exposed by the defendants and crushed and broke 
the said waterpipe so that very large quantities 
of "~a ter were released therefrom under great 
force and at high velocity and flowed from said 
pipe across the ground and upon and across the 
premises of the plaintiffs through the house \vith 
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which said.· prernises were and are improved com-
pletely soaking and saturating the s~d frame 
building and all of its contents and leav1ng heavy 
deposits of mud and silt therein and filling up 
the cesspool of the parties, completely destroy-
ing luggage of the parties of the value of One 
Hundred ( $100.00) Dollars, completely destroy-
ing a French bouvai rug of the value of One 
Hundred ( $100.00) Dollars, completely destroy-
ing clothing of the parties of the value of Three 
Hundred Seventy Five ($375.00) Dollars and 
household linens of the parties of the value of 
Fifty ( $50.00) Dollars, and groceries of the value 
of Ten. ( $10.00) Dollars. Plaintiffs were further 
compelled to expend and they did. expend the sum 
of Three Hundred ($300.00). Dollars for remov-
ing the said mud and silt from their said dwelling 
house and cleaning the same and cleaning and 
polishing the said furniture and cleaning drift 
and debris from the yard deposited therein by 
said waters and cleaning the garage of the parties 
situated on said premises and redigging and re-
pairing the said cesspool and repairing doors and 
furniture damaged by water and cleaning and 
repairing the said fireplace in the said dwelling. 
The parties were further compelled. to expend and 
did expend the sum of Tvvo Hundred Twenty Five 
($~25.00) Dollars in and about the repair and 
replacement of hardwood flooring ruined and 
damaged by said waters and mud and silt and 
the further sum of Fifty ( $50.00) Dollars in and 
about the cleaning and repair of clothing of the 
parties which they were able to salvage from the 
flood caused by the negligence of the defendants 
as aforesaid. The said premises and the dewll-
ing house thereon have further been damaged be-
yond repair in the sum of Five Hundred ($500.00) 
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Dollar~, and the furniture of the plaintiffs has 
been damaged beyond repair in the sum of One 
Hundred rr"·enty Five ($125.00) Dollars all to 
the damag·e of the plaintiffs in the sum of One 
Thou~and Eig·ht Hundred and Twenty Five 
( $1,8~5.00) Dollars. 
'' "\\ ... H~REFORE, plaintiffs pray judg·ment 
against the defendants and each of them in the 
~urn of One Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty 
Five ( $1,825.00) Dollars, for cost of suit and for 
such other and further relief as to the court may 
seem meet. ' ' 
Defendant Power Company demurred generally and 
specially to such complaint as follows (omitting title 
and signatures) : 
·'Comes no\Y the defendant, Utah Power & 
Light Company, and demurs to the complaint of 
the plaintiffs on file herein and for cause thereof 
alleges: 
'' ( 1) That said complaint does not state facts 
sufficient to constitute the cause of action at-
tempted to be pleaded in said complaint, or any 
cause of action against this demurring .defendant. 
"(2) (a) That said complaint and particu-
larly paragraph 2 thereof is uncertain in this, 
that it cannot be ascertained therefrom whether 
the improvements upon the said real property 
claimed to be owned by the plaintiffs were con-
structed to or subsequent to the construction of the 
water pipe referred to in paragraph 4 of said 
complaint. 
''(b) That said paragraph of said complaint 
1~ ambiguous for the foregoing reasons. 
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'' (c) That said paragraph of said complaint 
is unintelligible for the foregoing reason~. 
" ( 3) That said complaint and particularly 
paragraph 4 thereof is 
" (a) uneertain in this, that it cannot be 
ascertained therefrom whether the said pipe re-
ferred to therein was constructed prior or sub-
sequent to the improvements upon the land 
claimed to be owned by the plaintiffs, as set out 
in paragraph 2 of said complaint, nor can it be 
ascertained therefrom by whom said pipe) was 
constructed, whether by this demurring defend-
ant or by the United States of America or by 
whom, nor can it be ascertained therefrom what 
contractual obligations it is claimed there were 
bet,veen the parties mentioned in said paragraph 
of said complaint, nor can it be ascertained there-
from when it is claimed that the said pipe was 
o'vned, controlled or maintained by the said de-
fendants jointly, nor can it it ascertained there-
from why it is claimed that this demurring de-
fendant was jointly responsible with the other 
persons named in said paragraph or any of them, 
for the care and maintenance of said pipe. 
'' (b) That said paragraph of said complaint 
is ambiguous for the foregoing reasons. 
'' (c) That said paragraph of said complaint 
is unintelligible for the foregoing reasons. 
'' ( 4) That paragraph 5 of said complaint 
is uncertain in this 
" (a) That it cannot be ascertained there-
from whether the plaintiffs claim that this de-
murring defendant was negligent in the con-
struction of said pipe or whether it is claimed 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by ~aid eomplaint that this demurring defendant 
\\~as negligent in the maintenance thereof, nor 
can it be ascertained therefrom why such con-
strnetion or maintenance was in violation of any 
duty to the plaintiffs, nor can it be ascertained 
therefrom 'Yhy this demurring· defendant was 
negligent in failing to protect said pipe from 
stones or boulders rolling down the mountain 
side, as set out in said complaint, nor can it 
be ascertained therefrom how or why it is claimed 
that this demurring defendant 'vas guilty of any 
carelessness or neg-ligence in leaving said pipe 
unprotected upon the surface of the ground, nor 
can it be ascertained therefrom why it is claimed 
this demurring defendant could have known that 
in the spring of eYery year, or at any time, rocks 
\\'"ould be loosened by the melting of frost or other-
wise and roll down the side of the mountain and 
across the place where said pipe line was main-
tained, nor why or for what reason this demurring 
defendant 'vas under any duty to prot·ect the said 
pipeline from any rocks or boulders. 
''(b) That said paragTaph of said complaint 
is ambiguous for the foregoing reasons. 
'' (c) That said paragraph of said complaint 
is unintelligible for the foregoing reasons. 
'' ( 5) That said complaint and particularly 
paragraph 6 thereof is uncertain in this : 
'' (a) That it cannot be ascertained therefrom 
ho\\r or \vhy it is claimed that there was any negli-
gence upon the part of this demurring defendant 
in leaving said pipeline exposed, as therein set 
out, nor can it be ascertained therefrom whether 
it is claimed by the plaintiffs that said pipeline 
was constructed prior or subsequent to the said 
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impro-vements upon said property claimed to be 
owned by the plaintiffs, or whether said personal 
property therein described ,vas placed therein 
prior or subsequent to the construction of said 
pipeline, nor can it be ascertained therefrom when 
it is claimed that said pipeline was constructed.'' 
A similar demurrer was filed by defendant Water 
Users. 
The demurrers were overruled, whereupon defend-
ants separately answered, putting in issue the question 
of its negligence and plaintiffs' damage, and further 
affirmatively pleaded that the pipeline which became 
broken, allowing water to flow on to plaintiffs' prem-
ises, was constructed by the United States in the years 
1935 and 1936 under contract with Barnard Curtis Com-
pany, and under plans and specifications prepared by 
the United States and in accordance with best approved 
engineering practices, and along the only practical and 
feasible route therefor, and that the pipe line at all times 
remained and was maintained in the same condition as 
originally constructd and installed; further that plain-
tiffs' acquired the premises that were damaged sub-
sequent to the building of the pipeline and subsequent 
to April 5, 1944, well knowing of the existence and loca-
tion of the pipeline and the manner in which it was instal-
led; further, that the proximate cause of plaintiffs' dam-
age, if any, was not any act of omission or commission 
of the defendants, but was the act of the State Highway 
Commission in banking snow on either side of the high-
way and thus channelling water flowing from the break 
down the highway onto plaintiffs' premises, instead of 
10 
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flo"·ing into the riYer a~ it otherwise naturally would 
have done; further, that plaintiffs' action was barred 
by the provi8ion8 of section 104-2-30, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 19±3. 
THE FACTS 
()n ~fay :28, 1935, the United States entered into a 
contract ""ith Barnard-Curtiss Company under which the 
latter \Yas to construct a conduit, or wood stave pipeline 
from Pineview Dam in upper Ogden Canyon down the 
canyon to the mouth thereof. The pipeline was 75 inches 
in diameter and was for the purpose of conveying water 
from the dam for electric power developments and for 
irrigation of extensive acreages in Weber and Box Elder 
counties. It runs in a generally easterly and westerly 
direction. The line was constructed during the years 
1935 and 1936, in accordance with plans and specifica-
tions prepared by the lTnited States, and along the route 
selected by it. (Exhibit 6 and 7, Tr. 140, 141.) Subse-
quent to the building of the pipeline, plaintiffs acquired 
a home in the canyon some distance below the Dam, and 
fronting on the canyon highway. (Tr. 119). On the eve-
ning of February 28, 1946, a break occurred in the pipe-
line about three-fourths mile easterly (towards the dam) 
of plaintiffs' home; the water flowed from the break 
onto the highway, and then down the highway until it 
reached plaintiffs' premises, where it flowed upon the 
premises and into the home. Prior to this snow fall in 
the canyon had been quite heavy, and in plowing the snow 
therefrom the State Highway Commission had banked 
it along each side of the highway and had it not been for 
the sllo\Y so banked along either side of the highway the 
11 
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water would not have flown down the highway to plain-
tiffs' premises, but would have left the highway and 
flown into Ogden River long before it reached plaintiffs' 
premises. (Tr. 193-198; 205; 232. At the point where 
the break in the pipeline occurred, the pipeline is located 
about 50 feet north of the highway, and at an elevation 
above the highway. In installing the pipeline at this 
point a cut was made in the side of the canyon and 
the pipe laid at the base of the cut (Tr. 212). The cut 
is about 25 feet deep, and the face of the cut rises di-
reetly above the north side of the pipe about 25 feet 
(Tr. 212).. Above the cut to the north th·e canyon opens 
out into a gradual slope until it reaches precipitous 
cliffs some half mile farther north {Tr. 186-188). On 
the evening of February 28, 1946, a large ma.ss of rock 
hecam·e dislodged from these -cliffs some half mile to 
the north of the canyon, and a large boulder came down 
the slope in great leaps and hounds toward the pipeline. 
As it approached the pipeline it struck the ground about 
68 paces to the north of the cut, at the base of which 
lay the pipeline, and then apparently leaped hig·h in the 
air and descended a.t a point where it just cleared the 
brow of the cut and struck the pipeline, tearing a hole 
in it, from which flowed the water which reached plain-
tiffs' premises. (Tr. 180). Immediately following the 
accident a large rock, weighing some 91j2 tons, was 
found lying in the highway directly below the break 
in the pipeline. ( Tr. 230, 241). 
Following the construction of the pipeline by the 
United States, the responsibility for its maintenance 
had been turned over to the defendants. 
12 
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Plaintiffs' cause of action, as we understand it, is 
predicated upon the theory that defendants were negli-
gent in the ·construction of the pipeline, and in its main-
tenance, in that they should have forseen this danger 
to the line and have taken precautions in addition to 
'vhat they did, to guard against it. The court by its 
Instruction No. 7, (Tr. 276) itself determined that there 
\\TH~ no evidence in the ease of negligence in the matter 
of maintenance, and purported to submit the case to the 
jury solely upon the theory of negligence in its con-
struction. 
The evidence in further detail will be considered 
in connection with Points I and II of the Argument. 
STATE~IENT OF ERRORS UPON WHICH 
APPELLANTS RELY 
1. The lo"\\7er court erred in overruling defendants' 
demurrers. 
. 2. The lower court erred in denying defendants' 
motions f·or non-suit following plaintiffs' opening state-
ment. 
3. The lower court erred in denying defendants' 
motions for non-suit following completion of plaintiffs' 
case in chief. 
4. The lower court erred in denying defendants' 
motions for directed verdict. 
5. The lower court erred in refusing to g·ive defend-
ants' Requested Instruction No. 1 ( Tr. 265). 
13 
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6. The lower court erred in refusing to give defend-
ants' Requested Instruction No. 9. (Tr. 268). 
7. The lower court erred in refusing to give defend-
ants' Requested Instruction No. 14 (Tr. 269). 
8. The lower court erred in giving Instruction No. 
1 (Tr. 273-274). 
9·. The lowercourt erred in g1v1ng that portion of 
Instruction No. 1 reading a.s follows: 
"The defendants and each of them well knew, 
or by the exercise of reasonable care should have 
known that in the spring of every year rocks 
being loosened on the melting of the frost roll 
down the sides of said mountains and across the 
place ''rhere the defendants laid and maintained 
said pipe 'vithout protecting the same from said 
rocks and boulders," ( Tr. 284-285). 
10. The lo"\'\rer court erred in giving that portion of 
Instruction No. 1 reading as follows: 
''The defendants by their answers deny that 
they were negligent in the construction and main-
tenance of said pipeline, and deny that there was 
any negligence on their part directly or proxi-
mately causing any damages which the plaintiffs 
may have suffered, and defendants pray that said 
complaint be dismissed," (Tr. 285). 
11. The lo,ver court erred in giving Instruction No. 
o. (Tr. 275). 
12. The lower court erred in giving that portion of 
T ustruction No. 5 reading as follows : 
14 
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.. It is the efficient cause,-the one that neces-
sarily sets in operation the factors that accom-
plish the injury," ( Tr. 285). 
13. The lo,Yer court erred in giving Instruction No. 
9 (T )-(j· )--) . r. :,., -:...t t • 
14. The lo,ver court erred in giving that portion of 
Instruction 9 reading as follows 
··\V-ater collected by g-ravitation manifests a 
power familiar to all, capable of accomplishing 
useful and beneficial purposes, or destructive 
and disastrous consequences and results,'' ( Tr. 
285). 
15. The lower court erred in giving that portion of 
Instruction 9 reading as follows : 
'
4 If the defendants in this action interfered 
"-ith or undertook to control the force of the water 
flowing down Ogden Canyon, for their own pur-
poses, by the diversion of that water into a 
wooden pipe constructed along the side of the 
canyon and above the land, home and other prop-
erty of the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Knig·ht, the 
law requires the defendants so doing to use ordi-
nary judgment, skill, care and caution in the con-
struction and maintenance of that pipeline and in 
the use of the pipeline for the coursing of water 
in order that the property of the plaintiffs may 
not be injured.'' ( Tr. 286). 
16. The lowercourt erred in giving Instruction No. 
10. (Tr. 277-278). 
17. The lower court erred in giving that portion of 
Instruction 10 reading as follows: 
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''If the defendants constructed the \vooden 
pipeliue referred to in the evidence in this case or 
conveyed waters through the same for their own 
purposes, the defendants were under a duty to 
use the same care which an ordinary prudent man 
\vould use in the construction and operation of 
the pipeline to prevent the escape of water from 
the pipe to the damage of those in the vicinity.'' 
(Tr. 287). 
18. The lower court erred in giving that portion of 
Instruction 10 reading as follows: 
''The degree of care required to prevent the 
escape of water is commensurate with the damage 
or injury that will probably result if the water 
does escape,'' ( Tr. 287.) 
19. The lower court erred in giving that portion of 
Instruction 10 reading as follows: 
''In this case if a reasonable prudent man 
would anticipate that the damage 'vhich would 
probably result if the water should escape from 
the pipeline here involved would be high, then the 
degree of care required to prevent the escape of 
-vvater from this pipeline would he high." (Tr. 
287). 
20. The lower court erred in giving that portion 
of Instruction 10 reading a.s follows : 
''If you find from a preponderance of all of 
the evidence in this case that the defendants, in 
the construction of the pipeline in this case, failed 
to exercise that degree of care to prevent the 
escape of water from the pipeline which an ordi-
nary prudent man in the same or similar circum-
stances would exercise in the protection of said 
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pipeline from roeln; rolling do\Yll the eauyou hill-
~idt\ that eould reasonably be anticipated to roll 
do\\'11 the canyon hillside, and that as the untural 
~n1d proximate rP8nlt of their neglect to exercise 
that care \Vater e~;eaped from the pipeline and 
enu~ed dn1nage and injury to the property of the 
plaintiffs, then yon ::-;hould find for the plain-
tiffs.'' (Tr. :287). 
21. The lo\\'er eourt erred in giving Instruction No. 
1:2. (Tr. 278-279). 
:2:2. The lo,ver court erred in giving that portion of 
Instruction 1:2 reading· as follows : 
·'Such sum as \vill reasonably compensate 
said plaintiffs for damage to their clothing, but 
not to exceed the sum of $375, the amount claimed 
by plaintiffs." (Tr. 279). 
23. The lower court erred in giving that portion of 
Instruction 12 reading as follows: 
"'Such sum as will reasonably compensate 
said plaintiffs for the reasonable repair actually 
needed of clothing of the parties which they were 
able to salvage, but not to exceed the sum of $50, 
the amount claimed by plaintiffs." (Tr. 279) 
24. The lower court erred in giving that portion of 
Instruction 12 reading as follows : 
''Such sum as \vill reasonably compensate 
said plaintiffs for the reasonable expenditure 
marle b~T them and "rhich was actually necessary 
for removing the said mud and silt from their 
<lw,elling housP and cleaning the same, and clean-
illg· and polishing of said furniture, and cleaning 
drift and debris from the ~Tard, and cleaning the 
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garage, and re-digging and repairing the cesspool, 
and repairing doors and furniture damaged by 
water, and cleaning and repairing the fire place 
in the said d'velling, but not to exceed the sum of 
$300, the amount claimed by the plaintiffs." (Tr. 
279). 
25. The lower court erred in giving that portion of 
Instruction 12 reading· as follows : 
''Such sum as will reasonably compensate 
said plaintiffs for the reasonable damage beyond 
repair of the furniture, but not to exceed the sum 
of $125, the amount claimed by plaintiffs.'' ( Tr. 
279). 
THE ARGUMENT 
For the purposes of argument, and in the interests 
of brevity, certain of the assigned errors will he grouped, 
and considered collectively. 
I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING 
DEFEN·DANTS' DE~!URREtRS, IN DENYING DE-
FE~NDANTS' M·OTION FOR NON-SUIT FOLLOW-
ING PLAINTIFFS' OPENING STATEMENT, AND 
IN D.ENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR NON-
SUIT FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF PLAIN-
TIFFS' CASE IN CHIEF. (ASSIGNED ERRORS 1, 
2 and 3). 
Plaintiffs' complaint as amended, and defendants' 
demurrer thereto is set forth herein at pages 3 to 10. 
Plaintiffs' opening statement to the jury is at pages 3 
and 4 of the transcript. The allegations of defendants' 
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llf~gl igt>uce. ~o far a~ the complaint is concerned, are as 
embodied in parag-raph 5 of the complaint. The expected 
proof of such ueg·ligencP, a~ t:\videnced by plaintiffs' 
opening 8ta.temeut, is ~ho,vn at page 4 of the transcript. 
In substance sueh asserted negligence is that the 
defendant's constructed the pipeline in such a manner 
as to leave it above ground and exposed at the point 
\\There the break actually occurred, Without protective 
covering from rolling· rocks, knowing· that in the spring 
of the year rocks become dislodged above the pipeline 
from melting frosts, and roll toward and across it. 
Plaintiffs' evidence was limited to a. showing that the 
pipeline "\Yas above ground at points near where it was 
broken on the evening of February 28, 1946, that in 
the past small and larg·e rocks have been dislodged from 
the canyon "\Yalls and rolled upon the highway, hut not 
in this particular area, (Tr. 16-17), that no evidence of 
rolling rocks at the place where this break occurred was 
observed over a period of thirty-five years prior to 
February 28, 1946, (Tr. 19), that near the place where 
this break occurred a break occurred in another pipe-
line about t\venty-five years previous, (Tr. 26-31) but 
the witness couldn't say what caused that earlier break 
(Tr. 29), that a small 24 inch pipeline owned by Ogden 
City, that was rotten and deteriorating, was damaged by 
rolling rocks in the past (Tr. 32-36), that only one 
previous break had occurred in the existing pipeline, 
which is evidenced in this action, which break occurred 
some year~ before, and in a different area (Tr. 40-41), 
that this pipeline at the point of the break on February 
28, 194-G, 'vas eovered '"'ith earth to a depth of six inches 
(Tr. 42). 
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It is defendants' contention that neither the allega-
tions of the complaint, plaintiffs' opening statement, or 
plaintiffs' evidenee showed any actionable negligence 
on the part of the defendants. '11he most it shows is 
that the pipe line was located so as to he in a position 
to be struck by rolling rocks if uncovered, that it had 
been struck and broken by a rock at least once before, 
but in a different area, it had never been struck or broken 
in this particular area before, and it was covered in this 
particular area to a depth of at least six inches, which 
obviously was sufficient to protect it from a rolling rock. 
Defendants' position is that this case is governed by 
the decision of this Court in the case of Logan, Hyde 
P.ark & Smithfield Canal Co. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 
45 Utah 491, 146 P. 560. The facts in that case are sim-
ilar to those in the instant case. There plaintiff was 
the owner of an irrigation canal which, at the point of 
the alleged injury, was constructed along the side of a 
steep mountain. Defendant constructed a wooden flume 
along the same mountain side about fifty feet above 
plaintiff's canal.. Above the canal and flume, along the 
mountainside were many boulders of various sizes, some 
very large. There were also many loose rocks of various 
sizes, some of which would, from time to time, become 
loosened and roll down the mountainside. On 1lay 22, 
1913, a large rock rolled down the mountainside, struck 
and broke defendant's wooden flume, and water flowing 
from the break therein damaged plaintiff's canal. The 
rock started about 500 feet above defendant's flume. 
Defendant's flume was six feet high, the upper four 
feet being completely exposed. The flume was con-
structed as such flumes usually are in this state, along 
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the incline or contour of the mountain, and it was suf-
ficient for the purpo~e for \Vhich it was constructed. 
While roekB of Yariou~ ~izes from time to time rolled 
do"·n the mou11tai11, there \Va~ no evidence of previous 
damage to the flume during the twelve years it had been 
iu exi~tence .. r_rhere \Ya~ no evidenc.e that defendant did 
anything to c.ause the rock to be placed where it was, or 
to 8tart it rolling dow11 the mountain. 
U poll 8Uch evidence defendant moved for a non-suit, 
which was denied. Defendant then produced evidence 
showing it \vas in no \vay connected with the loosening of 
th~ rock in question, and also produced evidence (the 
nature of \vhich is not apparent from the opinion) from 
which it was made to appear that some person who was 
stranger to the defendant, c.aused the rock to roll. In 
its decision this court said : 
··The denial of the motion for a nonsuit is assig-
ned as error, aJ?.d it is also insisted that the ver-
dict is not supported by any evidence of negligence 
on the part of the defendant. 
"It seems to us this contention is sound. True, 
plaintiff's counsel contend that, in view that there 
were many large boulders and loose rocks along 
the steep incline on the mountain side above the 
flume, it was the defendant'B duty to guard 
against injury to its flume from any o£ the rocks 
that might become dislodged and roll down the 
mountain side. According to plaintiff's own evi-
dence, however, such a danger or contingency was 
quite remote. The evidence is conclusive that the 
\rooden flume \\'as in operation for at least twelve 
years before the rock in question struck and in-
jured it. IB it negligence not to forsee and guard 
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against the consequences of an occu1Tence of the 
character in question here, -vvhich happens only 
once in t-vvelve years, and may not occur again or 
is it any evidence of negligence~ If such be the 
law, then the only method by \vhic~ the defendant 
can make itself immune against su1ts for dam.ages 
caused by rocks that may roll down the mountain 
side and which cause injury to its flume, and may 
thus result in causing the \Vater flowing therein 
to cause damages, is to remove all the rocks that 
are along the mountain side above the flume, or 
build the flume into the mountain side and cover 
it over so that no rocks could possibly injure it. 
The latter is what plaintiffs counsel sug·gest de-
fendent should have done. To require that seems 
quite unreasonable. 
'' ·courisel for plaintiff have, however, cited 
one case, namely H·owe v. West Seattle L. & I. Co., 
21 Wash. 594; 59 Pac. 495, which they claim sup-
ports their contention. In that case the defendant 
placed a large log on the brink of a precipitous 
inc'line, and after it had lain there for some time 
a landslide occurred, which caused the log to roll 
down the 1nountain side, and in its course it struck 
and killed plaintiff's infant child. That case is not 
point here, for the reason that the defendant in 
that case placed and left the log in an unsafe and 
dangerous place or position. That case falls with-
in the principle laid down by us in the ease of 
Furkovich v. Bingham, Etc., Co., 45 Utah 89; 143 
Pac. 121. In that case it was the defendant that 
set in n1otion the instrumentality which, in rolling 
down the mountain side, eaused the injury to the 
plaintiff there, while in the Howe case, supra, the 
defendant left the instrumentality, the log, in such 
an unsafe place or position that it was forced 
down the mountain side by natural forces, which, 
under the evidence and circumstances the~e shoV\rn, 
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thl~ \\'"n~hiuglou court held the defendant should 
haYl~ t\n·~el'll. No ~nell conditions are involved in 
the l'H~e at bar . 
.. The ea~e of :B-,lemiug Y. Rail \vay, 158 Pa. 130; 
:2j .A.tl. ~~ L. 1~. A. 351; 38 Am. St. Rep. 835, 
i~, hO\\·t·ver, ~qnarely in point in favor of the de-
fendant. In that case, the· same as here, a rock, 
from ~orne uukno\Yll cause, became dislodged and 
rolled do\vn a bteep cliff, and in its course struck 
a railroad train and killed a passenger w·hile 
riding in a coach in said train. There, as here, the 
defendant \Yas in no \Yay connected with the in-
~trumentality (the rock) which caused the injury, 
and the court held that therefore it could not be 
held liable, and reversed the judgment. That 
case, in the ,,·riter 's judgment, \vas much stronger 
in favor of the plaintiff there than this is the case 
at bar in favor of the plaintiff here. "Te cannot 
see ho\v this judgment can he sustained upon any 
sound legal principle.'' 
That case, we submit, is conclusive as to this. Except 
for one factor, the facts are identical. That one factor 
makes defendants' position in this case stronger than 
in the Logan, Hyde ~ark Case. In the Logan, Hyde 
Park case at least four feet of the flume was exposed 
to the danger of rolling rocks. In this case, as shown 
by plaintiffs' testimony, the pipe line was completely 
covered at the place of damage. (Tr. 42). In that case 
it vvas the first break in twelve years; in ours, while 
there had. been a previous break in another area some 
t\\·o yPal·s previous, the only damage in this area \vas 
t\\·euty-five years previous, and there \\'as no proof that 
it haLl be('ll cause<.l by a rolling rock. 
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In this case plaintiffs' claim, as evidenced by their 
complaint, that defendants were negligent in not pro-
tecting the line from rolling rocks. r_rhe answer to that 
is in the language of this court in the Logan case : 
"If such he the law, then the only method by 
which the defendant can make itself immune 
against suits for damages caused by rocks that 
may roll down the mountain side and \\~hich cause 
injury to its flume, and may thus result in causing 
the water flowing therein to cause damages, is 
to remove all the rocks that are along the moun-
tain side above the flume, or build the flume into 
the mountain side and cover it over so that no 
rocks could possibly injure it. The latter is \vhat 
plaintiff's counsel suggest defendant should haYe 
done. To require that seems quite unreasonable.'' 
The lower court conceded that decision was control-
ling in this case, except for one factor which it felt dif-
ferentiated the two. That point of distinction, the lower 
eourt held, was that defendant in the Logan case offered 
evidenee that a stranger loosened the rock. We contend 
that is not an important factor, first, because that came 
in as part of defendant's case, and this court held that 
defendant's motion for non-suit should have been gran-
ted; second, this court does not mention that factor as 
being important to its decision; and, third, it can't have 
any hearing upon the matter. To hold that it is the 
determining factor, is to say that defendants' are obliged 
to anticipate damage from acts of God (our case), but 
not to anticipate damage from acts of humans. This, of 
course, is not the law, as it is elementary that an injury 
resulting directly and proximately from an act of God 
is not recoverable. 43 C. J. 7 46. Hence, if it be con-
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eeded thn t it i~ not neg·ligence to construct a pipe line 
or flume in this mountainou8 area along a mountain side, 
eren though it i~ eJ.~posed to rocks as in the Logan case, 
and thi8 court held in the Logan case that such was not 
negligeuee, then \Yhether the rolling rocks are started 
do\\·n\\·ard by humans or by an act of God is immaterial. 
In other \vords, if these defendants would not be liable 
if stranger~ had loosened the rock that caused the dam-
age, a fortiori they are not liable when the rock is 
loosened by an act of God. 
The only claimed negligence, accordingly, being that 
defendants constructed the pipeline without adequate 
protection from rolling rocks, and this court having held 
in the Logan case that such is not negligence in an area 
where experience has shown that damage therefrom is 
infrequent, and plaintiffs' own evidence having shown 
that damage from rolling· rocks in this area was ex-
tremely infrequent, the lower court erred in overruling 
defendants' demurrer, in denying defendants' motion 
for non-suit on plaintiffs' opening statement, and in 
denying defendants' motion for non-suit at the conclusion 
of plaintiffs' case in chief. 
A situation very similar to that involved in the 
present case is found in the case of LeDeau v. Northern 
Pac~fic Railroad Company (Idaho), 115 Pae. 503. In 
that case a rock came leaping and bounding down the 
side of a mountain and through the window of one of the 
defendants' railway cars, striking and injuring a passen-
ger. The Court there said: 
"The only question for consideration is that 
of neglig-ence. It is clear from this evidence that 
ihe rock did not fall from the Bide of the cut. It 
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\vas e\'iclentl v not an overhanging or loose rock 
left on the fa.ee of the cut through which the track 
\vas laid. The respondent seems to think that the 
rock came from hig·h up on the mountain side, and 
that theory is borne out by the testimony of 
the other \vi tnesses, as well as by the surrounding 
circumstances, and the actual falling· of the stone 
and its striking the car at the height and place 
'where it did strike. It must have come from a 
considerable distance, in order to have g·ained suf-
ficient momentum to drive it from the place where 
it last struck the ground above the face of the cut, 
and carry it through the ear window in the direc-
tion in which it was passing when it struck 
respondent. 
"It is clear, therefore, that the accident did not 
occur by reason of anything which the appellant 
or its agents or employes did, nor did it occur 
through any defect in the appliances which appel-
lant was using, or the instrumentalities it was 
employing as a common carrier. The only theory 
on which appellant could be held for the results 
of this accident would be that it owed to respon-
dent, and to all of its passengers, an active duty 
to employ such means as were necessary and 
sufficient to either clear the mountain side of 
loose and overhanging rock and stone, or else to 
construct along its right of way such retaining 
walls or barriers as vYould be likely to prevent 
rock and stone from rolling down the mountain 
side onto its track. To require such an active 
duty on the part of a railroad company operating 
in this intermountain region, where roads are 
necessarily built through canyons and arounrl 
mountain sides, \vhere the bluffs and hills rise 
prPcipitonsly for hnndrP< ls and sometimes thou-
Bands of feet above, would be imposing upon the 
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l·on1pa11.'{ a duty that "rould be burdensome, and 
might sometiint:B prove prohibitive to transpor-
tation companie:s. The mere suggestion of build-
ing retaining \Vall:s along· railroad rights of way 
through some of the canyons and ravines in this 
mountainonB country, demonstrates its futility. 
X o company could support such an expense.'' 
A eaBP to the same effeet is the case of Fleming vs. Pitts-
burg Rail\Yay Company (Penn.) 27 Atl. 858. 
II. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
DEFENDANTS' 1IOTION FOR DIRECTED VER-
DICT, AND IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFEND-
ANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBER 
ONE, WHICH WOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY TO FIND FOR THE DEFE!NDANTS AND 
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS. 
At the conclusion of all the evidence defendants 
moved the lo\ver court for a directed verdict ( Tr. 257-
260), and upon its denial submitted its proposed Instrue-
tion No. 1 directing the jury to find for the defendants 
and against plaintiffs. This was refused. (Tr. 265). 
Error is assigned. 
Following completion of plaintiffs' evidence, the 
substance of which, insofar as it related to defendants' 
negligence, has heretofore been discussd, and following 
defendants' motion for non-suit (which was denied), 
defendants offereu evidence affirmatively showing their 
freeuo1n from ueglig·ence. 
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J. R. Iakisch, th eng·i11eer in charge of the construe-
tion of this pipeline by the United States Bureau of 
Reclamation (and whose qualifications are unquestioned) 
testified that the specifications for construction of the 
pipeline (Defendants' Exhibit 7) were prepared by en-
gineers of the Bureau of Reclamation, that they were 
prepared in accordance with best approved engineering 
practices, that the line was constructed in accordance 
with the specifications (Tr. 141), and that due considera-
tion was given to reasonably anticipated damage from 
falling rocks (Tr. 143). On cross examination he testi-
fied that economic factors enter into the question of 
completely burying a pipeline in a mountainside, and 
in determining whether it is to be of wooden or steel 
construction (Tr. 147-148). On redirect he testified that 
this particular damag·e occurred in an area in which, in 
his judgment, there was less reason to anticipate dam-
ages from falling or rolling rocks than any other area; 
that the slope above the pipeline is gradual until cliffs 
a long distance away are reached Tr. 148), and that 
the cost of a complete tunnelling of the mountain for the 
pipe line (Tr. 149) or complete elimination of all possible 
hazards (Tr. 156) would have been prohibitive. 
The witness J. W. Farrell, who resided at Huntsville, 
at the top of Ogden Canyon, and who was a former em-
ployee of the defendants, testified that as he was on his 
way home between 6 :30 and 7 :00 o'clock P. M. on the 
evening of February 28, 1946, he met the water coming 
down the highway from the break in the line at a point 
about a thousand feet belo\v the break (Tr. 158), and half 
a mile above plaintiffs' house (Tr. 168). He proceeded 
through the water to the home of the pipeline's caretaker 
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at l)incyjp"· Pam, a mile aboYe the brenk (Tr. 167) and 
a~~i~ted the earPtakt~r in elosing the gates at the dam 
thron<~·h "~hieh \Yater \Ya~ fh)\ving into the pipeline. He 
then \\·ent on home, but returned the next morning to 
the point of the break in the pipeline. A large hole was 
torn in the south, or do\\·n hill side, of the pipe, and a 
large rock la~- on the north shoulder of the highway (Tr. 
163). He described the terrain to the north of the break 
as a rather gradual 8lope to some precipitious cliffs in 
the distance. ( Tr. 165). He further testified that pre-
Yious to the break the line at the point of the break was 
completely covered (Tr. 175 ). 
D. :JI. Grover, the caretaker at the dam, testified that 
after he had shut the water off he went to the point of 
the break, but it \Yas too dark to see much. He returned 
the next morning·. The south side of the pipeline was 
torn out, indicating the rock had hit it just over the top 
(Tr. 180). A big· rock four or five feet high and six 
feet long lay in the road below the break. From the 
terrain it appeared that the rock had bounded down the 
hill, last striking the earth before reaching the line about 
sixty-eight steps north of the line. From that point it 
jumped to the top of the pipeline. ( Tr. 180). 
Mr. W. J. Blackburn testified that from an inspec-
tion of the cliffs above the break, and the terrain between 
the cliffs and the pipeline, one could see where a portion 
of the cliff had broken away, and how a large rock had 
come bounding down the slope toward the pipeline, 
striking the ground at points, and leaping clear of the 
brush at othPrs. The distance from the break in the line 
to the cliffs \\·hich had broken away was upwards of a 
half mile. (Tr. 186-188) 
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The witness, Roney K. Inama, described the pipe-
line at the point of the break as having been laid at the 
base of a cut, with the face of the cut rising on the north 
side of the line about twenty-five to thirty feet. The 
hole in the line was on the top and south side (Tr. 212). 
David A. Scott testified as to ho'v the terrain above 
the break showed how the rock had come down in great 
leaps and bounds from the cliffs, which he put at three-
fourths mile above the break, towards the pipe line. (Tr. 
223) 
Defendants' witnesses testified at length on other 
matters, but the above is sufficient for present purposes. 
Plaintiffs' contention was that defendants were negli-
gent in not protecting the pipeline from rolling rocks; 
that a rock, loosened by the frost had come rolling down 
the mountainside, striking and breaking the pipe, and' 
the waterflowing from the break had caused damage to 
plaintiffs. The defendants' evidence supplied the de-
tails. First, the pipeline was in fact covered at the point 
of the break. Second, not only was it covered, but at the 
point of the break it was laid at the base of a twenty-
five foot cut. So the line was adequately protected from 
rolling rocks, in that it was actually covered, but _more 
important it was at the base of the cut, so that rocks 
rolling toward it would, upon reaching the brow of the 
cut twentyfive feet above it, be carried by their own 
momentum beyond the pipeline at the base of the cut. 
What then is the explanation of this accident~ It 
lies in the description of the terrain betwe·en the cliffs 
a half to three-quarters of a mile to the north and the 
line itself, as given by the witnesses. A portion of these 
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cliffs broke a\vay. A large rock came do\vn the slope 
from the cliffs, traYeling· in enormous leaps and bounds. 
It struck the earth about 8ixty-eight steps north of the 
line, lPaped hig·h in the air, and in coming down barely 
clPared the bro\Y of the cut at the base of which the pipe 
"-a~ laid, and in it~ descent struck the line on its south-
erly top side. It \Yas not an ordinary rolling rock that 
broke the line. It \vas truly a phenomenon. With the 
pipeline laid as it \vas at the base of the cut, the timing 
of the rock had to be perfect. A little lesser or greater 
momentum, and the line ,,-ould not have been hit-had 
the rock last struck the earth sixty -seven or sixty-nine 
paces, instead of sixty-eight, above the line, it would 
have cleared. 
The eventuality is not one that could reasonably 
haYe been forseen, and such is the test of negligence. 
The pipe line \vas amply protected from ordinary rol-
ling rocks. If there was a duty on the part of defend-
ants to guard against such dangers, that duty wa.s ful-
filled. Accordingly, we submit, that defendants' ·motion 
for directed verdict should have been granted. The 
evidence of defendants established, as a matter of law, 
that their duty to protect the line from forseeable haz-
ards "ras mo1~e than fulfilled, and it was error to submit 
the rna tter to the jury. 
Another reason why under all the evidence a ver-
·dict should have been directed for defendants is to be 
found in the decision of this Court in the case of Ward 
v. h1alt Lake (}ity, 46 Utah 616, 161 Pac. 905. As above 
pointe<l out, plans and specifications for this pipeline 
\\'Pre prepa1·ed by the Bureau of Reclamation of the 
United States, and strictly in accord "rith best approved 
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engineering practices. The pipeline was constructed 
in accord~nce with such plans and specifications. There 
is no conflict in the evidence as to these matters. 
In the Ward case the question involved was whether 
the defendant was negligent in its construction of a 
certain gutter along a street in Salt Lake City. ()n the 
part of the city it wa.s shown without conflict that the 
paving, the gutters, the covering thereon and the side-
walk thereon were all constructed in accordance with 
a plan prepared and recommended by a competent civil 
engtneer. 
In considering the question of the city's negligence 
under these circumstances this co.urt said: 
''It seems to us tha.t under the undisputed 
evidence the verdict and judgment cannot prevail. 
It has frequently been held by the courts-indeed, 
so far as we are aware, there is little, if any, 
diversity of opinion upon the proposition-that 
a municipality may adopt and follow a plan pre-
pared by a competent civil engineer in making 
public improvements, including the paving and 
guttering of streets and in constructing sidewalks 
and cross-walks, and that the question of whether 
such plans are sufficient or proper cannot he re-
viewed by the courts, except upon the grounds 
pointed out by us in the case of Morris v. Salt 
Lake City, 35 Utah, 485, 486, 101 Pac. 373, and 
cases there cited. A municipality, as a matter of 
course, is liable for a negligent execution of its 
plans, or for permitting the improvements which 
are constructed in accordance therewith to be out 
of repair or to becomP unsafe. It may however 
. ' ' 
not be sued because some citizen, or many of them 
for that matter, may think that the public im-
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provement, although constructed according to the 
plans <~doptt>d a11~.l follovved as aforesaid, are un-
safe or could be improved. Where public im-
proYement8 arp constructed in accordance with a 
plan prepared and adopted as aforesaid, the city 
i8 liable only in case the improvement, when con-
~tructed in accordance \Yi th such plan, is clearly 
insufficient or unsafe.'' 
In the case of JV atters c. City of Oma.ha (Neb.) 110 
K. \\,... 9"81, in considering- this matter the Court said : 
·'In this case, as in ordinary cases grounded 
on negligence, the acts or omissions of the defend-
ant upon which the charge of negligence is based 
are to be tested by the conduct of a man of 
ordinary care and prudence in like circumstances. 
The improvement of which the stairway in quest-
ion is a part is of such a character that it could 
be planned and eonstructed only by men of pe-
culiar skill and knowledge in that line. The city 
authorities, therefore, were compelled to employ 
experts to plan and construct it. In doing so, 
they did precisely what a man of ordinary care 
and prudence would have done in like circum-
stances. Where·, then, is the point of departure 
from the course of conduct such a man would 
have pursued~ Is it in the adoption of the plan~ 
They had employed men skilled in their profes-
~ion to prepare it. Had they not a right to rely 
on the superior judgment and skill of such men~ 
Would not a man of ordinary care and prudence 
have done so in like circumstances, unless the 
plan \vas so obviously defective that there could 
be no difference of opinion among reasonable men 
with respect to it~" 
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To the same effect are the following· cases: 
.Brantz v. Fargo, 19 N. D. 538, 125 N. \V. 1042, 
27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1169. 
Town of Spencer v. Niayfield, J;~ Ind. App. 134, 
85 N. E. 23; 
Gallagher v. City of Tipton, 1:33 ~fo. 557, 113 S. 
W. 674; 
Hays v. City of Columbia, 159 Mo. 431, 141 S. 
w. 3; 
Rome v. Cheney, 114 Ga. 194, 39 S. E. 933, 55 L. 
R. A. 221; 
Lansing v. Toolan, 37 Mich. 153. 
If it he said that that rule of law is applicable only 
as regards construction work d0ne by the sovereign, and 
we can conceive of no rational reason for such limi-
tations,as individuals must rely upon the judgment of 
expert engineers the same as governments must, never-
theless it is applicable here, because this pipeline was 
constructed by the government. Defendants came into 
the picture only after the project was completed. The 
only issue was negligence in construction-alleged negli-
genee in maintenance and operation having been de-
leted. (Instruction No. 7, Tr. 276). Defendants can be 
liable only if the United States would have been liable if 
it had retained the pipeline, and under the Ward de-
cision, supra, the United States could not have been 
liable as the line was constructed under specifications 
prepared and approved by competent engineers. 
Still another reason why plaintiffs may not recover 
in this action is to be found in the doctrine of assumed 
risk. The evideuee shows tthat the line was completed 
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1n 1936. Plaintiff~' hon1e "·cls built thereafter in 1938 
or 1939 ( r~rr. ~3-l), and plaintiffs acquired it after its 
con:struction ( Tr. 118). Plaintiffs knew of the exist-
ence of the pipeline. C~rr. 119) Thus the manner of 
construction and complete location of the line were in 
being at the time plaintiff8 acquired their prope-rty. 
The. doctrine of assumed risk is succinctly stated in 
38 Am. Jr. 845: 
''The principle that one who voluntarily 
assumed the risk of injury from a known danger 
is debarred from a recovery is recognized in negli-
gence cases. As stated, a plaintiff who, by his 
conduct, has brought himself within the operation 
of the maxim, 'Valenti non fit injuria,' cannot 
recoYer on the basis of the defendant's negligence 
In the words of the maxim as translated, 'that 
to \vhich a person assents is not esteemed in law 
an injury.' Although there is authority for con-
fining the doctrine of assumption of risk to cases 
arising out of the relation of master and servant, 
or at least to cases involving a contract relation-
ship, it is now fairly well settled that the defense 
of assumed risk may exist independently of the 
relation of master and servant. The maxim 
'volenti non fit injuria' applies in a proper case 
independently of any contract relation. It is 
said that one \vho knows, appreciates, and de-
liberately exposes himself to a danger 'assumes 
the risk' thereof. '' 
Thus \Ye urge that plaintiffs, acquiring their prop-
erty subsequ0nt to thP building of the line, with know-
ledg-e of its existence aud location, cannot now recover 
for damages sustained by reason of said pipeline. 
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One other point perhaps mel·its comment. In plain-
tiffs' cross examination of Mr. Iakisch it was sought 
to be established that there was perhaps a safer v.ray to 
construct the line than that followed, as for example, 
building it of steel or concrete, instead of wood. The 
evidence is undisputed that the line \Vas constructed in 
accordance with best engineering practices. In fact, 
except for the sugg·estion on cross-examination of 1\fr. 
Iakisch that it might have been built of steel or con-
crete, or given a wooden snow shed covering (Tr. 155), 
plaintiffs' offer no suggestions as to how the line should 
have been constructed to have protected it against this 
rock. Their silence is understandable, for who can sug-
gest what precaution might have sufficed. Certainly a 
rock the size of this one, dropping from above as this 
one did, would have crushed any ordinary steel or con-
crete line as .easily as it did this wooden one. Burying 
it deeper, unless it was under many feet of earth and 
rock, would have been of no avail. The weight of the 
rock, as it dropped from above, would have had its 
effect for a considerable depth below the surface. And 
if defendants must insure against damage from this 
rock, must they also insure against damage by one 
twice or ten times as large~ If so, they just can't lay 
their lines near the mountains, because it is within the 
realm of possibility that the entire side of a mountain 
might some day slip away. However, the fact that there 
ma.y have been a safer method is beside the point. 
''If one has acted with ordinary pl'udence he 
is not negligent, although danger might have been 
avoided if he had acted in a different manner, 
and hence, the doing of an act in a particular 
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mainH_\r It-' not neeessarily negligent merely be-
eause there may ha,Te been a safer manner of 
doing it.,' ±3 C. J. 698. 
III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO GIVE TO THE JURY DEFENDANT·S' RE-
QlTE.STED INSTRlTCTIONS NOS. 9 and 14 (ASSIGN-
~JEXTS OF ERROR NOS. 6 and 7) 
Defendants duly and timely requested the court to 
instruct the jury as follows : 
·'DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9. 
The Court charges you if you find from the evi-
dence in this case that the rock which caused the 
break in the pipeline in question herein, was a 
part of a precipice or cliff which existed prior to 
said break and was approximately from one-half 
of a mile to a mile distant from said pipeline, then 
the Court charges you that the defendants were 
not required to anticipate that such rock would 
be so broken from said precipice or cliff, and 
therefore the plaintiffs would not be entitled to 
recover in this action." (Tr. 268) 
"DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14. 
rrhe court charges you that if you find from the 
evidence in this case that the water that flowed 
down onto the road from the break in the pipe-
line in question, \vould have flowed into the river 
but for the fact that the State Road Commission 
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had prevented the water from so flowing into 
the ri·-v'er by placing an embankment of sno\\' on 
either side of the roadway, which caused the 
water to flo"r dovvn the road ,,·ay on to plaintiffs' 
premises, then you must find for the defendant~ 
no cause for action." (Tr. 269-) 
The lower court refused to give each of such re-
quested instructions, and such refusal is assigned as 
error. 
(a) As to defendant~' requested instruction No. 9. 
The evidence in the case, and as hereinbefore out-
lined, established that the rock which broke the pipeline 
broke from a cliff upwards of a half mile north of the 
line. The location of the cliffs from which this rock 
came, in relation to the line, is further evidenced by 
the photographs received in evidence as exhibits. It 
is defendants' contention that the care required of them 
was not such as a matter of law as would require them 
to forsee the likelihood of a rock falling from this cliff 
reaching and damaging the line. Hence, the defendants 
were entitled to such instruction, and the lower court 
erred in refusing it. 
(b) As to defendants' requested instruction No. 14. 
The pipeline at the point at which it was damaged 
lies a few feet north of the highway, and at a higher 
elevation. Plaintiffs' home was located down the wind-
ing canyon road about three-fourths mile from the point 
of the break. ( Tr. 193) Ogden River parallels the high-
way down the canyon, and at the point of the break it 
is immediately south of the highway. There are several 
points along the highway between the point of the break 
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and plaintiff::;' h<nne at ~which \Vater on the highway will 
fhnY therefrom and into the river if unimpeded. One of 
such point~ is about 75 to 100 feet down the highway 
from the point of the break. ( Tr. 193-196) In other 
''?ords, the \Vater flo\ved from the break onto the high-
\Yay, and then flo\ved do\vn the highway. Under normal 
conditions it \Vould have flowed from the highway and 
into the river long before it reached plaintiffs' property, 
probably within 75 to 100 feet from the point at which 
it reached the highway. Prior to the time of the break, 
ho\YeYer, the State Hig·h,vay Commission, in its :main-
tenance of this highway had plowed the snow therefrom 
and into banks on either side which were from two and 
a half to three feet hig·h, and which banks of snow had 
become frozen. The effect thereof was to form a channel 
of the highway from which the water could not escape 
as it flowed down the highway toward plaintiffs' pro-
perty. Tr. 193-198; 205; 232; Exhibit 17; 233)~ 
Defendants' contention is that had it not been for 
the action of the highway maintenance crews banking 
the snow along the highway as they did and in such a 
way as to prevent the normal flow of water from the 
highway into the river, the water flowing from the 
break would not have reached plaintiffs' property three-
fourths mile a\vay, but would have flowed into the river 
long before it reached plaintiffs' property. That in view 
of this fact any negligence of defendants in the premises 
was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs' damage, and 
the Court should have so instructed the jury. 
A terse and clear statement of what in law consti-
tute:::; proximate cause was made by this Court in the 
case of Rollo~w c. Ogde'n City, 66 Utah 475, 243 P. 791. 
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'~The 1n·oxin1a te cause of an injury is the 
primary moving cause without which it would not 
have been inflicted, but which, in the natural and 
probable sequence of events, a11d U'ithout tlle in.-
terventio·n of any ·J·t.,~w or iJirl epende1lt ca.use, pro-
duces the injury.'' 
Apply that definition of proximate cause to this 
case. For the water flowing from the break in defend-
ants pipeline to be the proximate cause of plaintiffs' 
damage the circumstances must be, first, that "in the 
natural and probable sequence of events'' it would have 
produced the damage, and second, production of the 
damage must be ''without the intervention of any new 
or independent cause.'' 
In this case the evidence 1s without conflict that 
"in the natural and probable sequence of events" any 
large amount of \vater flowing from the break would 
have passed into the river long before reaching plain-
tiffs·' property and without damage to plaintiffs. The 
reason it didn't go into the river, in the natural sequence 
of events, is because highway maintenance crews pre-
vented it from so doing, and actually channelled it down 
the highway a distance of some three quarters of a mile 
to a point where it flowed onto plaintiffs' property. 
There was thus the intervention of a . ''new or irl:depen-
dent cause'', without \vhich damages to plaintiff would 
not have resulted. 
We submit that the defendants were entitled to 
their requested instruction No. 14, and the lower court 
erred in not giving it. 
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IV. 
1,HE I_.jOWER l'iOl'RT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUC-
TIOXS 1, 3, 9, 10 and 1:2. (ASSIGNJ\tiENTS OF ER,ROR 
8 TO 25). 
(a) AS TO INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
By its instruction No. 1 the lower court sought to 
outline to the jury the claims of the parties as embodied 
in the pleading·s. In its recitals as to plaintiffs' con-
tentions the court stated that it was contended by plain-
tiffs that ''defendants carelessly and negligently left the 
said pipe lying unprotected upon the surface of the 
ground. ' ' ( Tr. 273) There is no evidence in the case 
that the pipeline was either unprotected or lying upon 
the surface of the ground, and on the contrary the evi-
dence 'Yas not controverted that the pipeline was pro-
tected by the cut, at the base of which it was laid, and 
further '-ras covered by at least six inches of earth. 
While it is true that the foregoing was stated only 
as a contention on the part of plaintiffs, we submit that 
it is improper to advise the jury as to claims made in 
the pleadings, in support of which no evidence is offered, 
unless the jury is further instructed that no proof there-
of has been made, as it tends to mislead the jury into 
believing that there is evidence in the case in support 
of such contention. In other words, in advising the jury 
a~ to the claims of the parties, only such claims should 
be stated in support of which competent evidence has 
been received. 
The court further, as a part of its instruction No. 1, 
stated: 
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"The defendants and each of them \\?ell kne\\', 
or by the exercise of reasonable care should have 
known that in the spring of every year rocks being 
loosened on the melting of the frost roll do,vn the 
sides of said mountains and across the place 'vhere 
the defendants laid and maintained said pipe 
without protecting· the same from said rocks and 
boulders.'' 
Defendants duly excepted to this portion of the in-
struction (Tr. 284). 
The court doesn't preface its assertion by any posi-
tive statement that this too is but a claim of the plain-
tiffs, but throws it in as an established fact, which we 
submit was error, as it was a controverted issue in the 
cause. 
Nor do we believe that the final paragraph of the 
instruction cures the error, as it relates only to "allega-
tions and denials'' of the parties, and, as indica ted, this 
portion of the instructions was not given as being merely 
an allegation of the plaintiffs. · 
(b) AS TO INSTRUCTION NO. 5. 
The court's instruction No. 5 reads as follows: 
"The 'proximate cause' of an injury is that 
cause which,-in a nat.ural and continuous sequence, 
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, pro-
duces the injury, and without which the result 
would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause, 
-the one that necessarily sets in operation the 
factors that accomplish the injury. It may oper-
ate ·directly or by putting intervening agencies 
in motion." (Tr. 275) 
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Defendants duly excepted to the whole of the in-
8truction, and separately to the sec.ond sentence thereof. 
( Tr. j85) 8uch 8econd sentence, we submit, is not 
a correet 8tatement of the la\Y, and as it tends to modify 
the first sentence, the instruction is had and it was error 
for the c.ourt to give it. 
The effect of the instruction as given 1s to define 
proximate cause as being· merely 
'• the efficient ea use,-the one that necessarily 
sets in operation the factors that accomplish the 
injury''. 
Under the definition of proximate cause given by 
this court in Rollow v. Ogden City, supra, proximate 
cause is not simply the ''efficient cause'', as given by 
the lo\Yer court, but the ''efficient cause'', if one wants 
to use that phrase, which, in the natural and probable 
sequence of events produces the injury, w·ithout the in-
tervention of any new or independent cause. Those 
limitations on "efficient cause", which limitations are 
essential to proximate cause, were wholly lacking or 
nullified by the instruction as given. 
(c) AS TO INSTRUCTION NO. 9. 
The instruction as given reads as follows: 
'• Water eollected by gravitation manifests a 
power familiar to all, capable of accomplishing 
useful and beneficial purposes, or destructive and 
disastrous consequences and results. 
If thP defendants in this action interfered 
\\'ith or undertook to control the force of the water 
flo,ving dcnvn ()gden Canyon, for their own pur-
poses, by the diversion of that water into a 
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wooden pipe constructed along the side of the 
.canyon and above the land, home and other pro-
perty of the plaintiffs, Mr. and l\Irs. Knight, the 
law requires the defendants :::;o doing to use ordi-
nary judgment, skill, care and caution in the con-
struction of that pipe line and in the use of the 
pipe line for the coursing of \vater in order that 
the property of the plaintiffs may not be injured. 
In so constructing, and using the said wooden 
pipe line to conduct and control that water, they 
are required to anticipate and prepare to meet 
such emergencies as may reasonably he expected 
to arise in the course . of nature, although they 
are not required to prepare to meet unlooked 
for and overwhelming displays of adverse power 
of such a nature as to surprise cautious and 
reasonable men in the same circumstances." (Tr. 
276) 
Defendants duly excepted to the whole thereof, and 
separately as to each paragraph (Tr. 285, 286). 
The first paragraph of the instruction is obviously 
a purely gratuitous theoretical observation of the court 
which, we submit, embodies no statment of law, and 
which has no place in instructions of law. We feel it 
was error for the court to make this purely gratuitous 
observation. 
The second paragTaph is devastating. By its in-
struction No. 7 the court instructed the jury that negli-
gence in construction 'vas the only issue in the case, 
and negligence in maintenance is out, and then immedia-
tely follows with its instruction No. 9 in which the jury 
is instructed as to defendants' duty in their use of the 
line. 
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(d) ~A.S TO INSTRt:CTION NO. 10. 
rr hi~ iu~truetion as g·iven is as follows: 
· • If the defendants constructed the wooden 
pipeline referred to in the evidence in this case 
or conYeyed \Yaters through the same for their 
O\\'U purposes, the defendants were under a duty 
to u~e the same care which an ordinary prudent 
man \vould use in the construction and operation 
of the pipeline to prevent the escape of water 
from the pipe to the damage of those in the 
Yicinity. The degree of care required to prevent 
the escape of water is commensurate with the 
damag·e or injury that will probably result if the 
\Yater does not escape. In this case if a reason-
able prudent man \Yould anticipate that the dam-
age \vhich would probably result in the water 
should escape from the pipeline here involved 
would be high, then the degree of care required 
to prevent the escape of water from this pipeline 
would be high. If on the other hand a reasonable 
prudent man in the same or similar circumstances 
would anticipate that the damage which would 
probably result from the escape of the water in 
the pipeline would be only small or slight, then 
the degree of care required would be correspon-
dingly low. If you find from a preponderance of 
all of the eYidence in this case that the defendants, 
in the construction of the pipeline in this case, 
failed to exercise that degree of care to prevent 
the escape of water from the pipeline which an 
ordinary prudent man in the same or similar 
circumstances \vould exercise in the protection 
of said pipeline from rocks rolling down the can-
yon hillside, that could reasonably be antici-
pated to roll down the canyon hillside, 
and that as the natural and proximate 
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result of their neglect to exBrcise that care 
water escaped from the pipeline and caused dam-
age and injury to the property of the plaintiff:-;, 
then you should find for the plaintiffs and assess 
their damag·es in such amount as you find to be 
reasonable under the evidence and the other in-
structions of the court. (Tr. "277) 
Defendants duly excepted thereto, and separately as 
to each of the first three sentences thereof and the last 
sentence. (Tr. 287) We find the same error as in In-
struction No. 9. The court, having taken negligence in 
maintenance from the jury by Instruction No. 9, has 
again given it back, for the court says: 
''the defendants were under a duty to use 
the same care which an ordinary prudent man 
woud use in the construction and operation of 
the pipeline to prevent the escape of water from 
the pipe to the damage of those in the vicinity.'' 
(Tr. 277) 
(e) AS TO INSTRUCTION NO. 12. 
By subparagraphs (c) and (h) and subparas-
graph (f) and (j) the court instructed the jury that if 
they found for the plaintiffs they might award them-: 
" (c) Such sum as will reasonably compen-
sate said plaintiffs for damage to their clothing, 
but not to exceed the sum of $375, the amount 
clainv;;d by plaintiffs. 
(h) Such sum as will reasonably compensate 
said plaintiffs for the reasonable repair actually 
needed of r1othing of the parties \Yhich they were 
able to salvage, but not to exceed the sum of $50, 
the amount claimed by. plaintiffs. 
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(f) Such sum as \rill reasonably compensate 
said plaintiffs for the reasonable expenditure 
made by them and \Yhich \vas actually necessary 
for removing· the ~aid mud and silt from their 
d\Yelling house and cleaning the same, and clean-
ing and polishing of said furniture, and cleaning· 
drift and debris from the yard, and cleaning the 
garage, and re-dig·ging and repairing the cess-
pool, and repairing doors and furniture damaged 
by \Vater, and cleaning and repairing the fire 
place in the said d\velling, but not to exceed the 
sum of $300, the amount claimed by the plaintiffs. 
(j) Such sum as \vill reasonably compensate 
said plaintiffs for the reasonable damage beyond 
repair of the furniture, but not to exceed the sum 
of $1~5, the amount claimed by plaintiffs.'' (Tr. 
:279) 
Exceptions to these portions of such instruction 
\vere duly taken. (Tr. 279) It is apparent that by sub-
paragraphs (c) and (h) the court instructed the jury 
that it might award twice for the same damages referred 
to in such instructions. The same is true as to subpara-
graphs (f) and ( j). This clearly was error. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants accordingly submit that the lower court 
erred 
(1) in over-ruling defendants' demurrers; 
(2) in denying defendants' motions for non-suits; 
( 3) in denying defendants' motions for a directed 
verdict; 
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( 4) in refusing to give defendants' requested in-
structions in the particulars hereinbefore noted. 
( 5) in instructing the jury as it did in the parti-
culars noted .. 
That such errors were substantial and prejudicial 
to defendants, and each of them, and the judgment of the 
lower eourt should he reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHARLES L. OvARD, 
HowELL, STINE AND OLMSTEAD, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Utah Power & Light Company 
DAVID K. HoLTHER 
Attorney for Defendant 
Ogden River Water Users 
Association. 
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